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Judges make determinations on a daily basis that profoundly affect
people's lives. On March 28, 1991, the Michigan legislature enacted a
statute entitled The Parental Rights Restoration Act (hereinafter "the
Michigan Act" or "the Act"). 1 This statute delegated to probate court
judges the extraordinary task of deciding whether a minor girl may have
an abortion without the consent of a parent. Nothing in law school and
little in an average judge's experience provide a meaningful framework
for making such a decision. Although many commentators, including
the authors, argue that decisions about abortion should be left to the
woman regardless of her age,2 or to the judgment of her doctor,' or to
counselors,4 this decision now rests with probate judges.
As clinical law professors and, thus, practicing attorneys, we have
represented several minor girls in their attempts to receive waivers of
parental consent to abortion under the Michigan Act. We were also
active in developing procedural rules to implement the statute and are
involved in training attorneys to represent girls in judicial waiver hear-
ings.5 Therefore, we have personally Witnessed the implementation of
the Act thus far in Michigan.
We intend to provide a framework for judicial decision making
under the Act by drawing on our personal experiences, reviewing treat-
ment of parental consent cases by other courts, and considering what
the discipline of psychology can tell us about adolescents. Ultimately,
we offer certain presumptions that Michigan judges should apply, and
we delineate those matters that are irrelevant to the inquiry into a
minor girl's maturity and best interests.
Each decision to grant or to deny a girl's petition for waiver of
parental consent is determinative of the teenager's future. Recent empir-
1. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.901-.908 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995). See Appen-
dix A for the full text of the statute.
2. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 473 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
3. See, e.g., Katherine M. Waters, Note, Judicial Consent to Abort: Assessing a Minor's
Maturity, 54 GEo. WAsH. L. Ray. 90 (1985). See also MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-
GEN. § 20-103 (1990); W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-3 (1995).
4. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 430 n.8 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
5. We helped develop attorney training materials. In addition, we have arranged to
have law students represent minor girls in parental consent to abortion hearings,
under Michigan's student practice rule (MICH. CT. R. 8.120). A simulated parental
consent hearing has been induded in the Women and the Law Clinic curriculum at
the University of Michigan Law School. Students from other dinical programs have
requested the opportunity to handle these cases, and we have involved those stu-
dents when possible.
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ical research confirms that the two best indicators of whether a woman
(and thus her children) will live in poverty are: (1) whether she had an
out-of-wedlock birth as a teen; and (2) whether she failed to graduate
from high school.6 Consequently, interfering with a teenager's abortion
decision may propel a teenage girl towards a life of poverty. Such
profound decisions should not be made without deep respect for the
minor's constitutional rights and for the unique way in which adoles-
cent girls must prove themselves deserving of constitutional protection.
I. THE "MATURITY" AND "BEST INTERESTS" TEST:
ORIGINS AND INTERPRETATION
Roe v. Wade7 recognized a woman's right to privacy in making the
decision whether to have an abortion. After this landmark decision, the
Supreme Court reviewed, in eight different cases, statutes specifically
restricting a minor's right to abortion.8 In Danforth, the Court quickly
rejected the possibility of a third party, spouse, or parent having abso-
lute veto power over a woman's abortion decision.
9
The Court in Bellotti II, reviewing a Massachusetts parental con-
sent statute, listed requirements for an alternative procedure.' The
Court ruled that the minor must have an opportunity to petition a
court for a waiver of the parental consent requirement." If she proves
that she is mature and well informed, the court must grant the waiver. 2
In the alternative, the court must grant a waiver of parental consent if
the waiver would be in the best interests of the minor. 3 The
6. Greg J. Duncan & Saul D. Hoffman, Teenage Underclass Behavior and Subsequent
Poverty: Have the Rules Changed? (Feb. 2, 1990) (on file with authors).
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
8. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Hodgson
v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City,
Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for
Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398
(1981); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (Belotti II); Bellotti v. Baird, 428
U.S. 132 (1976) (Bellotti I); Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52 (1976).
9. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69, 74.
10. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 643-44.
11. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 643-44.
12. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 643-44.
13. Bellotti I, 443 U.S. at 643-44.
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proceeding must also preserve the anonymity of the minor and must be
timely.14
While the Court recognized that minors have constitutional rights,
it acknowledged that states may restrict the rights of minors in ways
that would be unconstitutional if applied to adults.1 5 A pregnant minor
who is mature enough to make the decision on her own is deserving of
the same constitutional protection available to an adult woman. The
Supreme Court allocated to trial judges the responsibility of differentiat-
ing between minors in need of parental intervention, those mature
enough to bypass parental involvement, and those for whom parental
involvement could be detrimental. 6 In the last case, the court could
find the waiver of parental consent to be in the minor girl's best inter-
ests, notwithstanding her lack of maturity. 7
Although the Supreme Court made clear that the judicial bypass
procedure requires an opportunity to prove that the minor "is mature
enough" or that a waiver is in her "best interests,""3 the Court did not
define "maturity" or "best interests." In fact, other Court opinions note
the lack of guidance available to trial courts hearing petitions for waiver
of parental consent. 9
The most clearly stated criticism of the failure to define "maturity"
and "best interests" appeared in Justice Marshall's separate opinion in
Hodgson v. Minnesota:
The constitutional defects in any provision allowing someone to
veto a woman's abortion decision are exacerbated by the vague-
ness of the standards contained in this statute. The statute gives
no guidance on how a judge is to determine whether a minor is
sufficiently "mature" and "capable" to make the decision on her
own.... The statute similarly is silent as to how a judge is to
determine whether an abortion without parental notification
would serve an immature minor's "best interests." . . . Is the
judge expected to know more about the woman's medical needs
or psychological makeup than her doctor? Should he consider
14. Belotti II, 443 U.S. at 643-44.
15. Belotti II, 443 U.S. at 635-39.
16. Be/otti II, 443 U.S. at 647-48.
17. Bellott II, 443 U.S. at 647-48.
18. Betoti I, 443 U.S. at 643-44.
19. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 474 (1990) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring).
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the woman's financial and emotional status to determine the
quality of life the woman and her future child would enjoy in
this world? Neither the record nor the Court answers such
questions.20
Like the Minnesota Act, the Michigan Act provides no definition for its
key terms: "sufficiently mature" and "well-enough informed" and "in
the best interests of the minor."21
In his opinion in Bellotti II, Justice Powell noted the difficulties
associated with defining maturity:
Not only is it difficult to define, let alone determine, maturity,
but also the fact that a minor may be very much an adult in
some respects does not mean that his or her need and opportu-
nity for growth under parental guidance and discipline have
ended. As discussed in the text, however, the peculiar nature of
the abortion decision requires the opportunity for case-by-case
evaluations of the maturity of pregnant minors.22
Justice Powell is referring to the fact that a state may arbitrarily set an
age that defines maturity for various rights and privileges, such as
marriage, where the risk of requiring a mature minor to wait until she
reaches the age of majority is relatively low. On the other hand, the
urgency of the abortion decision requires an immediate determination
of the minor's maturity: she cannot simply wait until she is eighteen
and have the abortion at that time.' This urgency may justify the need
to determine maturity, but the Court gives no guidance as to how the
determination should be made.
In the first Supreme Court case reviewing a parental consent
provision, a slightly more specific definition of maturity was given.24
The Court quoted the dissenting district court judge, who stated that a
minor should be able to make her own decision "provided she is suffi-
ciently mature to understand the procedure and to make an intelligent
20. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 474 (Marshall, J., concurring).
21. MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 722.901-.908 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995).
22. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 n.23 (1979) (Bellotti II).
23. Bellott II, 443 U.S. at 642.
24. See Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
1995]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
assessment of her circumstances."25 As we shall see below, this definition
of maturity is consistent with our suggested judicial framework. This
language was not, however, specifically adopted by the Supreme Court,
leaving state judges with only the terms "maturity" and "best interests"
to guide their decision making.
The Supreme Court, in fact, has explicitly rejected possible limita-
tions on the definition of maturity. For example, in H.L. v. Matheson,
the Court flatly rejected the concept that a minor mature enough to
become pregnant was mature enough to decide to have an abortion,
stating "[t]here is no logical relationship between the capacity to be-
come pregnant and the capacity for mature judgment concerning the
wisdom of an abortion."26 Thus, a teen must prove more than her
biological maturity in order to meet the maturity standard.
In another parental consent case, the Court held that the City of
Akron could "not make a blanket determination that all minors under
the age of 15 are too immature to make this decision or that an abor-
tion never may be in the minor's best interests without parental approv-
al."27 Thus, at least one attempt to narrow the "maturity" and "best
interests" definition by requiring a minimum age limit for maturity
failed.
In sum, the Supreme Court has left trial courts to define
"maturity" and "best interests." Although some Justices have noted the
difficulty of defining "maturity" and "best interests," the Court has
failed to provide any rationale for leaving such a significant decision to
the discretion of state trial judges. The ramifications of this broad
discretion can have a profound effect on teenage girls.
25. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth,
392 F. Supp. 1362, 1376 (E.D. Mo. 1975)).
26. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 408 (1981). The Court cites no authority for this
conclusion. Indeed, a minor's physical and sexual development may indicate her
maturity.
Psychoanalysis has emphasized genitality as one of the developmental
conditions for full maturity. Genitality consists in the capacity to develop
orgastic potency which is more than the discharge of sex products in the
sense of Kinsey's 'outlets.' It combines the ripening of intimate sexual
mutuality with fill genital sensitivity and with a capacity for discharge of
tension from the whole body.
Emic H. EnnsoN, IDaNTIrr: YOUTH AND CiuSIS 136-37 (W. W. Norton 1968).
27. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 440
(1983) (emphasis in original).
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II. THE NATURE OF THE DECISION
In the absence of guidelines, the nature of the decision facing
Michigan probate judges under the Act is clearly discretionary. There
are no rules or definitions limiting a court's interpretation of "maturity"
and "best interests," the central terms of the Act. In his article on the
discretion allotted trial courts in child custody decisions, Carl E.
Schneider defines discretionary decisions and rule-based decisions:
[T]he ideal type of a "rule" is an authoritative, mandatory,
binding, specific, and precise direction to a judge that instructs
him how to decide a case or resolve a legal issue....
[D]iscretion describes those "cases as to which a judge, who has
consulted all relevant legal materials, is left free by the law to
decide one way or another."28
The Michigan legislature could have provided rules by which the pro-
bate courts should determine a minor's "maturity" and "best interests"
under the Act. For example, in Michigan, the legislature. has set out
twelve different factors that must be considered by trial courts in deter-
mining the best interests of children in custody decisions.29 However,
no similar rules or guidelines have been provided for parental consent
cases.
It is helpful to speculate briefly as to the reason for the discretion
afforded judges in this context. Professor Schneider discusses several
rationales for discretionary law. 0 The discretion permitted in parental
consent cases can best, but not exactly, be described as "rule-failure"
discretion:
[Rule failure discretion] is created where it is believed that cases
will arise in circumstances so varied, so complex, and so hard to
anticipate that no one could write rules that would accurately
guide decisionmakers to correct results and only to correct re-
sults in a sufficiently large number of cases.
31
28. Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules, and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA's Best-
Interest Standard, 89 MIcH. L Ray. 2215, 2226 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
29. MicH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 722.23 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995).
30. Schneider, supra note 28, at 2242-47 (identifies the various sources of discretion).
31. Schneider, supra note 28, at 2243.
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The judicial bypass procedure required by the Act, after all, was not the
creation of the Michigan legislature, but of the Supreme Court in
Bellotti I1 There is no reason to expect Michigan legislators to define
terms for which the Supreme Court provided no guidance. When terms
are broad and could have several different meanings, it is unclear what
would constitute a "correct result," making it nearly impossible to form
rules that would lead to the "correct results."
On the other hand, the discretion permitted in parental consent
cases does not fit the description of "rule-failure" discretion completely.
While it is true that the Michigan legislature could not easily write rules
to guide judges in applying ambiguous terms, it is not clear that the
circumstances arising in these cases will be "so varied, so complex, and
so hard to anticipate that no one could write rules."32 Generally, it is
not difficult to anticipate the fact patterns that will arise under the Act.
In one scenario, the minor girl will most likely be sixteen or seventeen
years old. She will not want to tell her parents about the abortion
because she wishes to avoid their anticipated anger, disappointment, or
humiliation.33 The other likely scenario will be a very young girl, per-
haps eleven or twelve years old, who will not be able to get parental
consent due to the abuse or neglect of her parents.3 4 In the former case,
the court is likely to find "maturity"; in the latter case the court is
likely to find the judicial waiver in the minor's "best interests." Cases
will occasionally fall between these two: older teens who do not have
many outward signs of "maturity" or young teens with nonabusive
families. In sum, the problem with writing rules is not the complexity
or unpredictability of the cases, but rather the inability to define what
the Supreme Court meant by "maturity" and "best interests."
Perhaps "maturity" and "best interests" fall within the realm of
terms that are hard to define but "we know it when we see it."35 If a
teen appears before a probate judge and tells the judge about her life,
32. Schneider, supra note 28, at 2243.
33. See Patricia Donovan, Judging Teenagers: How Minors Fare When They Seek Court-
AuthoriedAbortions, 15 FAM. PLAN. PERSp. 259, 262, 264 (1983).
34. Professor Scarnecchia represented an 11-year-old girl, pregnant as a result of rape,
whose mother had left her in the care of a known rapist. Although the mother
vacillated'as to whether she would consent to the abortion, the child's grandmother
supported the abortion decision. The father was unavailable to offer consent. The
minor's treating physician said that the abortion was medically necessary due to her
young age.
35. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting
that although hard-core pornography is hard to define, "I know it when I see it.").
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the judge presumably will be able to recognize her relative "maturity"
and her "best interests." In fact, most adults might feel that they could
make this judgment about teenagers without further guidelines. There
is, however, an inherent risk in leaving the judicial waiver decision to
the discretion of probate judges. Regarding a highly emotional, political,
and moral decision like abortion, each judge is likely to have established
personal beliefs. Broad discretion under the Act opens the door to the
conscious or unconscious expression of those personal beliefs by the
judge.
Indeed, Justices Stevens and Marshall warned of the broad discre-
tion that would fall to trial courts under the best interests standard and
the potential problems with that discretion. Justice Stevens wrote:
[The best interests] standard provides little real guidance to the
judge, and his decision must necessarily reflect personal and
societal values and mores whose enforcement upon the
minor-particularly when contrary to her own informed and
reasonable decision-is fundamentally at odds with privacy
interests underlying the constitutional protection afforded to her
decision.36
After citing the above quotation of Justice Stevens, Justice Marshall
wrote in the Hodgson case: "It is difficult to conceive of any reason,
aside from a judge's personal opposition to abortion, that would justify
a finding that an immature woman's best interests would be served by
forcing her to endure pregnancy and childbirth against her wiU." 37
In New Hampshire, an attempt to pass a parerital consent bill
failed, at least in part, due to concerns about discretion expressed by
state court judges who agreed that trial courts were not equipped to
make such decisions with no guidelines from the legislature. Justice
Souter, then a New Hampshire trial judge, wrote to the legislature on
behalf of all New Hampshire Superior Court judges to criticize the
proposed legislation that contained language similar to Michigan's Act:
The members of the court find ... fundamental problems
inherent in this provision .... [I]t would express a decision by
society, speaking through the Legislature, to leave it to an
36. Bellotri v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 655-56 (1979) (Bellotti II) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring).
37. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 475 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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individual justice of this court to make fundamental moral
decisions about the interests of other people without any
standards to guide the individual judge. Judges are professionally
qualified to apply rules and stated norms, but the provision in
question would enact no rule to be applied and would express
no norm. In the place of a rule or a norm there would be left
only the individual judge's principles and predilections. As
carefully considered as these might be, they would still be those
of only one individual, not those of society.3
Justice Souter cited two specific reasons why this lack of guidance from
the legislature was particularly troublesome. First, a constitutional right
was at stake:
Much criticism of the role of the judiciary in this country has
characterized judicial activity in the application of constitutional
standards as no more than imposition of individual judges' views
in the guise of applying constitutional terms of great generality.
The provision that I have quoted from the present bill would
force the Superior Court to engage in just such acts of unfet-
tered personal choice.39
Although it may be appropriate to give courts broad discretion in
deciding property divisions, child custody, or other family matters
where fundamental constitutional rights are not at stake, decisions
concerning the ability or inability to exercise constitutional rights
should be carefully limited to avoid the dangers of "unfettered personal
choice" cited by Justice Souter.4 0
The second danger noted by Justice Souter is the particularly
moral nature of the decision that the minor girl must make. He recog-
nized the risk that judges will simply substitute their own moral choice
for that of the teenager:
The court's second concern is with the necessarily moral charac-
ter of such choice and the resulting disparity of responses to
38. John Milne, Souter Note Helped Sink '81 N.H. Bill on Abortion; Letter Seen Offering
No Clue to Personal Views, BosToN GLOBE, July 26, 1990, at 1.
39. Milne, supra note 38, at 1.
40. We argue below that this justifies a presumption in favor of granting parental
consent waivers; see infra part V.D.
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requests that judicial discretion be exercised. As you would
expect, there are some judges who believe abortion under the
circumstances contemplated by the bill is morally wrong, who
could not in conscience issue an order requiring an abortion to
be performed. There are others who believe what may be
thought to be in the "best interests" of the pregnant minor is
itself just as necessarily a moral as a social question, upon which
a judge may not morally speak for another human being, what-
ever may be the judge's own personal opinion about the
morality of abortion. Judges in each category would be obligated
to indicate that they could not exercise their power in favor of
authorizing abortions to be performed on immature pregnant
minors.4
1
The moral nature of the abortion decision, therefore, further sets it
apart from other discretionary decisions. Justice Souter wrote that the
inability or unwillingness of some judges to grant or deny petitions on
moral grounds would lead to judges disqualifying themselves from
hearing cases and ultimately lead to forum shopping by the minor
girls. 2 The Justice's theory, however, was never tested in New Hamp-
shire, as the legislation failed.
Judges did choose to disqualify themselves from hearing parental
consent cases in Minnesota and Massachusetts under similar legislation.
In Minnesota, as of 1983, most of the judicial bypass petitions were
filed in Minneapolis, St. Paul, or Duluth, because very few judges
outside of these major cities would hear the cases. 3 Judge Allen
Oleisky, who heard most petitions filed in Minneapolis, believed "that
while some of the rural judges object on moral grounds to hearing these
petitions, others simply consider it to be politically inexpedient for
them to be involved."44 In Massachusetts, in 1983, of the sixty-two
judges who could hear judicial bypass petitions, eight refused to hear
any petitions (citing moral problems), and two more refused to hear
petitions filed by minors more than twelve weeks pregnant. 5 Other
41. Milne, supra note 38, at 1.
42. Milne, supra note 38, at 1.
43. Donovan, supra note 33, at 259.
44. Donovan, supra note 33, at 264 ("He points out that Minnesota judges are elected
to six-year terms, and that outside the Minneapolis area, Minnesota is a conservative
state.").
45. Donovan, supra note 33, at 265.
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judges were "so rude or difficult" that attorneys avoided bringing peti-
tions before them, leaving approximately forty judges' in the state to
hear the petitions. In Boston, only two judges out of fifteen were
hearing petitions.4 7 Similarly, although no judge in Providence, Rhode
Island had officially disqualified him or herself, one judge hears most of
the petitions because "her colleagues have reservations about minors'
not consulting with their parents."
48
Questioning why his colleagues in Minnesota refused to do their
duty to implement the law, one judge asked why no one had petitioned
the Supreme Court of Minnesota to enforce the judges' obligation to
implement the statute.4 9 This question brings us back to Justice Souter's
mention of the particularly moral nature of the abortion issue. If we, as
a society, are torn apart over the abortion issue, it is not surprising that
judges may choose to opt out of making decisions that permit or deny
an abortion. Ironically, we allow judges to make a choice about the
morality of abortion, while restricting the teenage girl's ability to make
a similar choice.
In Michigan, as well, some judges have resisted the granting of
parental consent petitions.5 Others have made their views so obvious
that attorneys might not file such a petition before those judges.5 ' The
Michigan Act is so new that more judges may decline to participate in
the process as time passes.
Appearing before judges who hear parental consent cases subjects
minor girls to the individual beliefs of those judges. This level of judi-
cial discretion poses threats to the petitioning minor even greater than
might be expected. For example:
46. Donovan, supra note 33, at 265.
47. Tamar Lewin, The Anguish of Asking a Court for an Abortion, N.Y. TIMEs, May 28,
1992, at B8.
48. Donovan, supra note 33, at 265.
49. Donovan, supra note 33, at 264.
50. Jaquelynn Boyle, Judge Says He Resents Abortion Waiver Law, DET. FREE Pap.Ss,
April 26, 1991, at IA, 12A.
51. Boyle, supra note 50, at 1A. See also Mark Fritz, Decision Due Friday Whether GirZ
11, Will Have Abortion, KuAmAzoo GAzETrE, October 21, 1981, at Al; Nickie
McWhirter, Judge Waffled and Ducked as the Rights Were Wronged, DET. Fraa.
PREss, October 26, 1981, at 1C (identifying a judge who refused to make a timely
order to permit 11-year-old rape victim to obtain an abortion prior to the enact-
ment of the Act).
[Vol. 3:75
JUDGING GIRLS IN ABORTION CASES
1. Judges may oppose all abortions on moral or religious
grounds, but fail to disqualify themselves from the process.52
2. Judges may be improperly influenced in their decisions by the
race, ethnicity, or social class of the minor.53
3. Judges may be unable to understand the position of the teen-
age girl because of gender or age differences between the
judge and teen.
4. Judges may view themselves in the role of substitute parents,
as opposed to jurists.
None of this indicates how a judge would decide a particular teenage
girl's case. It does indicate, however, that she may be telling her story
to a judge who might have some very particular ideas about what a girl
in her position ought to do.
In one study, attorneys and judges separately reviewed teen girls'
maturity. Judges found that only nine out of the 477 girls were imma-
ture.54 Attorneys evaluating the same pool of teens felt eleven were
immature.55 Remarkably, though, there was only one overlap; except in
one instance, no two evaluators concluded that the same girl was imma-
ture.56 This illustrates how subjective the evaluation of maturity can be.
Is this an unseemly discussion? After all, we want to believe that
judges will rise above differences between themselves and the litigants
52. For example, although not entirely predictive of a judge's position on abortion, the
strong anti-abortion position adopted by the Catholic Church suggests that at least
for Catholic judges a difficult moral conflict may exist when faced with a parental
consent waiver petition.
53. For example, poverty may affect how a teen displays her or his maturity. In a study
investigating the moral reasoning of adolescents from low-income neighborhoods in
Boston, researchers discovered that, at first glance, the statements of boys inter-
viewed could be interpreted as representing low developmental levels of moral
maturity. On doser analysis, their statements in fact "revealed a sense of morality
that could be misrepresented or missed entirely" by traditional measures of moral
development. Betty Bardige et al., Moral Concerns and Considerations of Urban
Youth, in MAPPING THE MORAL DoMAIN 159, 165 (Carol Gilligan et al. eds.,
1988).
Along with other findings of difference in how lower-income urban adolescents
described moral issues, this 'study suggests that teenage girls from low-income
backgrounds who are requesting a waiver of parental consent could display an
inaccurately lower level of moral maturity to the court or other evaluator.
54. Susanne Yates & Anita J. Pliner, Judging Maturit in the Courts: The Massachusetts
Consent Statute, 78 AM. J. oF PUB. HEALTH 646, 647 (1988) According to Yates
and Pliner, eight of those nine minors had their petitions granted on a best interests
analysis. The ninth went out of state to obtain an abortion.
55. Yates & Pliner, supra note 54, at 647.
56. Yates & Pliner, supra note 54, at 647.
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before them in order to make fair and equitable decisions.57 We have
just carefully reviewed, however, the complete lack of direction given to
judges making this decision. In discussing child custody decisions,
Professor Schneider points to fears that judicial discretion will result in
decisions that reflect the personal preferences of judges and notes:
"These fears reflect a classic and real problem with discretion-that it
permits the substitution of private for public rules, that it allows judges
to consult their own preferences and even prejudices rather than apply-
ing those social preferences that have succeeded in acquiring the force
of law."58 These fears are especially well-founded when dealing with
abortion decisions and thus justify concern over the nature of individual
judges who will be hearing parental consent cases.
In the quotation above, Professor Schneider suggests that, rather
than applying personal beliefs, judges should be "applying those social
preferences that have succeeded in acquiring the force of law."59 The
legislative history and media coverage of the Act reveal that the social
preference expressed in passage of the Act in large part reflected a desire
to decrease the number of abortions performed in Michigan by reduc-
ing the number of teen pregnancies and thereby reducing the number
of teens who choose abortion.6" While some legislators may have truly
desired to bring parents into the decision-making process, others were
influenced by a desire to make abortions illegal. Thus, the "social
preferences" reflected in the Act are, at best, mixed. Certainly, the need
to determine "maturity" and "best interests" was not incorporated into
the Act because of any social preference, but because the Supreme
Court mandated such a procedure to protect the constitutional rights of
the petitioning minors. There is no readily identifiable social preference
57. The validity of this assumption has been challenged in Michigan, however, by the
FINAL REPORT OF THE MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON GENDER ISSUES
IN THE COURTS (Dec. 1989) and the FINAL REPORT OF THE MICHIGAN SUPREME
COURT TASK FORCE ON RACIAL/ETHNIC ISSUES IN THE COURTS (Dec. 1989), which
demonstrated that judges as well as attorneys often take improper considerations
such as race, gender, or ethnicity into account in their treatment of litigants, clients,
and attorneys.
58. Schneider, supra note 28, at 2265.
59. Schneider, supra note 28, at 2265.
60. See JOURNAL OF THE SEATE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN at 2053-54 (Sept. 12,
1990) (statement of Sen. Welborn); JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF THE STATE OF
MICHIGAN at 2132 (Sept. 12, 1990) (statement of Rep. Gire). See also Barbara
Listing, Do Minors Need Parental Consent to Get Abortions? Pro, DET. NEws, Dec. 3,
1989, at 23A.
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to guide the court on the maturity or best interests issues, again leaving
probate judges with little direction.
Relatively few state appellate decisions have grappled with these
issues concerning parental consent or notice statutes. Those decisions
begin to create limitations on trial courts' definitions of maturity and
best interests but still fail to adequately define the terms.
III. EXPERIENCE IN OTHER STATES
As of September 1, 1995, thirty-three states besides Michigan had
parental consent or notification laws in effect.61 Of those thirty-three,
only two had no judicial bypass procedure.62 Most of those state stat-
utes, like Michigan's, follow the Bellotti II framework; they permit a
teen to bypass her parent's consent if she is found to be mature and
well-enough informed to make the abortion decision herself, or if not
consulting her parents is found to be in her best interests. 63 None of
those statutes, however, define maturity or give any more guidance to
judges charged with determining maturity than did Bellotti II.
In deciding whether the court initially hearing the petition abused
its discretion, state reviewing courts have struggled with how to deter-
mine whether the petitioner is mature.' One Florida Court of Appeals
went so far as to say that the lack of any statutory definition of what it
means for a petitioner to be "sufficiently mature" may render the
statute unconstitutional.6 5 The court said that the lack of definition
61. See infia Appendix B.
62. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304 (1995); AIAsx SrTA. § 18.16.010 (1994).
63. Two of those state statutes permit doctors, rather than judges, to determine ma-
turity or best interests. MD. CODE ANN., HFALTH-GEN. § 20-103 (1990); W. VA.
CODE § 16-2F-3 (1995).
64. To date, none of the reviewing courts have articulated or applied any review
standard other than abuse of discretion. See, e.g., In re Anonymous, 515 So. 2d
1254 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987); In re T.H., 484 N.E.2d 568 (Ind. 1985); In re Jane
Doe 1, 566 N.E.2d 1181, 1184 (Ohio 1990) ("'abuse of discretion [standard] ...
implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable'"
(quoting State v. Adams, 404 N.E.2d 144, 149 (Ohio 1980))).
65. In re E.B.L., 544 So. 2d 333, 335 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). See also In re J.V.,
548 So. 2d 749, 755 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (Walden, J., dissenting) ("the
determination [of maturity] is not appropriately left to a court of law"). In In re
J.V., 541 So. 2d 769, 770 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989), the court looked to the
American Heritage Dictionary to find a working definition of maturity. The court
found the dictionary definition to be consistent with what the authors here are
proposing: "worked out filly by the mind, considered." In re J.V., 541 So. 2d at
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allows the trial judge to "make arbitrary decisions based more upon
personal, moral, religious or political beliefs than upon constitutionally
permissible statutory guidelines."
66
Despite the confusion, reviewing courts have not even attempted
to define "maturity." At least one state court has explicitly refused to
define "maturity," claiming that to do so would usurp the legislature's
role.67 What reviewing courts have relied on to prove maturity demon-
strates just how much the decisions depend on the identity of the
decision maker. 8 In In re Mary Moe, the Massachusetts Appeals Court
suggested that there may have been sufficient evidence in the record for
deciding the teen was mature but affirmed the lower court's finding of
immaturity.
69
One Alabama judge found that the minor was not "sufficiently
mature" even though she was within a month of turning eighteen, lived
by herself, supported herself with a full-time job, had completed the
twelfth grade, had thought about the future and alternatives to abor-
tion, and had an abusive stepfather who would retaliate against the
minor's mother if she involved her mother in the decision.70 The teen
in this case was interviewed by Ms. magazine.71 She described how the
770 (quoting AmERlCAN HERAmGE DIcTnoNARY (2d ed. 1982)). Although the
appellate court noted the definition, it affirmed the denial of waiver on another
basis-the lack of a transcript from the hearing on the petition. In re J.V., 541 So.
2d at 769. The Florida statute was later held unconstitutional under that state's
constitution but not for lack of a definition of "sufficiently mature." In re T.W.,
551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989).
66. In re T.W., No. 89-893 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. May 12, 1989). Milne, supra note 38,
at I (May 13, 1981, letter from Justice Souter opposing the New Hampshire
Legislature's attempt to pass parental consent legislation).
67. In re Jane Doe 1, 5.66 N.E.2d 1181 (Ohio 1990).
68. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 474 (Marshall, J., concurring).
69. In re Mary Moe, 423 N.E.2d 1038, 1040, n.1 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981). The court
said that petitioner's responses were "articulate and informed." The petitioner said
she thought she was too young to raise a child; she did not want to place a baby for
adoption, because the pregnancy would disrupt her education; and she described the
medical procedures that would be used and the attendant risks. The appellate court
reversed on best interests, finding that the trial court had erred by finding that the
teen's "best interests" would be served only by her consulting at least one parent
and then re-petitioning the court.
70. In re Anonymous, 515 So. 2d 1254, 1255 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987). The Court of
Appeals reversed, stating "we can neither discern from the trial court's judgment nor
from the record any ground upon which the trial court's conclusion could rest. We
can safely say, having considered the record, that, should this minor not meet the
criteria for 'maturity' under the statute, it is difficult to imagine one who would."
71. Angela Bonavoglia, Kathy's Day in Court, MS., Apr. 1988, at 46.
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judge, Charles Nice, had pamphlets for adoption agencies and
anti-choice Christian ministries in his office. Judge Nice refused to
appoint the attorney the teen had brought to court with her and in-
stead appointed another attorney whom she had never met. The judge
then attempted to appoint the teen's original attorney as the attorney
for the fetus. During forty-five minutes of testimony, Judge Nice re-
peatedly asked the teen whether she had considered adoption and
instructed her attorney to ask her the same questions. When questioned
in an interview about why he had refused the petition, the judge stated:
"'I based it on her looks ... just something that comes across when
you talk to her ... her credibility."'72 Judge Nice also said that in
determining best interests "he would consider not only what is in the
minor's best interests, but what is in the fetus's best interests as well." 73
Another judge found that a petitioner was not mature, nor was
abortion in her best interests, even though she was twelve years old; the
victim of statutory rape; coherent and consistent in saying she wanted
the abortion; clear that she could not care for herself or a baby; clear in
stating that she had discussed with her aunts all of her options and
understood what they were; and was from a family with a history of
mental illness (her mother had not been consulted because she was
committed to the state mental hospital).74
Reviewing courts have stated that lower courts may consider the
presence and non-verbal acts of the petitioner as part of the decision
whether or not the teen should be found to be "mature."75 At least one
court has explicitly noted that the decision to seek a waiver of parental
consent is evidence of "maturity' in and of itself that the court ought
to consider.7
6
Rather than defining "sufficiently mature," some reviewing courts
seem content to permit lower courts to consider facts that have nothing
to do with maturity, but instead rate the morality of the petitioner. For
example, where a teen previously had undergone an abortion, courts
have found, based at least in part on that fact, that she is not "suffi-
ciently mature" to make the abortion decision now without consulting
72. Bonavoglia, supra note 71, at 50.
73. Bonavoglia, supra note 71, at 50.
74. In re Anonymous, 531 So. 2d 901, 905 (Ala. 1988) (corrected opinion on rehear-
ing) (trial court reversed on best interests standard).
75. See In re Mary Moe, 423 N.E.2d 1038, 1040, n.1 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981).
76. In reAnonymous, 515 So. 2d 1254, 1255 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987).
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her parents. 7 Whether the denial of the petition is based on the judge's
unrealistic definition of maturity or on a moral determination, the
result is to punish the teen for having sex.78
The teen who is found to be mature enough to make the decision
on her own should have the same constitutional right to an abortion as
an adult woman. Presumably agreeing with this premise, some review-
ing courts have limited the discretion of lower courts by requiring them
to follow the statutory framework. The Massachusetts Appeals Court,
for instance, has stated that parents do not have a right to participate in
the proceedings. 79 Other appellate courts have found that the trial court
cannot unduly burden the decision by premising the waiver on having
the abortion performed at a hospital rather than a clinic."0 Still others
have held that the petitioner has the right to counsel."
The decisions described above represent the few cases where re-
viewing courts have considered denials of petitions and published their
77. See In re T.P., 475 N.E.2d 312 (Ind. 1985); In re Jane Doe 1, 566 N.E.2d 1181
(Ohio 1990).
78. When a judge's determination of maturity is based on repeated pregnancies and/or
abortions, it is unrealistic because it does not take into account the level of igno-
rance, misinformation, and pressure on teens regarding sex. Teens of both sexes fail
to discuss contraceptive methods, are ignorant of birth control methods and how to
obtain or use them, and are afraid to discuss using contraceptives with their partner
for fear of alienating him or her. See Ellen Eliason Kisker, Teenagers Talk about Sex,
Pregnancy and Contraception, 17 FAm. PLAN. PERsp. 83 (1985). When the judge's
determination is based on a concern that the teen is sexually active, it is unrealistic
because it ignores the level of sexual activity by teens in general. See SELECr CoM-
MrIT= ON CHILDREN, YoUM, AND FXmiLius, U.S. HousE OF REPRESENTATIvES, A
DECADE OF DENIAL: TEENS AND AIDS IN AMER C A (102d Cong., 2d Sess.) (finding
68% of adolescent girls and 86% of adolescent boys are sexually active by age 20).
79. In re Mary Moe (No. 1), 498 N.E.2d 1358 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986). For other cases
addressing this, see In re Mary Moe, 423 N.E.2d 1038 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981)
(holding that where trial judge has found that an abortion is in a minor's best inter-
ests, it is reversible error to require parental consent); Orr v. Knowles, 337 N.W.2d
699 (Neb. 1983) (stating that if minor held mature enough, parental notice must be
waived). See also Donovan, supra note 33. At least one Michigan probate judge has
publicly stated that he intends to consult a teen's parents before determining that she
is mature: "Maybe I'm old-fashioned ... but I can't think of a better source of
information on the minor's maturity than her parents. ... It is to be remembered
that the name of the law is the Parental Rights Restoration Act. It is not named the
Minor's Secret Abortion Act... I believe [the parents] have a right to be heard
regarding their own daughter." Frank D. Willis, Van Buren County Probate Judge,
Letter to the Editor, COURIER-LEADER (Paw Paw, Mich.), Feb. 7, 1992.
80. E.g., In re Mary Moe, 517 N.E.2d 170 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987); In re Mary Moe,
469 N.E.2d 1312 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984).
81. E.g., In re Mary Moe, 523 N.E.2d 794 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988).
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decisions. These few published cases, however, do not reflect how the
vast majority of courts initially hearing these petitions decide whether a
minor is sufficiently mature or how the minor is treated during the
process. "'Laws are generally implemented through appeals. The judges
know that as long as they grant a minor's petition, there is nothing to
appeal, and therefore no one will look at how they conducted the
hearing."'82
In Michigan, there have not been any appellate decisions yet, and
few, if any, appeals of denied petitions. Consequently, there has been
no public review of what is occurring in different counties or in indi-
vidual cases. 3 What limits Michigan reviewing courts will put on
probate judges remains to be seen. The Association of Michigan Pro-
bate Judges has attempted to give the courts hearing the petitions some
guidance on how to make the "maturity" or "best interests" decision by
prescribing suggested questions that purport to get at the issue of
maturity." As will be shown below, those questions are largely irrele-
vant in determining whether a teen is mature enough to make the
abortion decision without consulting her parents.
IV. THE MATURITY OF ADOLESCENT GIRLS:
A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
Turning to the field of psychology for insight into adolescent
maturity, we find an interesting historical convergence. At the same
time that the Supreme Court asked state courts to determine "How
mature is this teenage girl?," psychologists were recognizing that all
prior research into adolescent development and maturity had been
based on the behavior of boys. Girls were simply compared to boys and
found to be lacking in comparison. More specifically, they were found
to be slower to develop and to separate themselves from their parents.
82. Donovan, supra note 33, at 266 (quoting Jaime Sabino, Chair of Massachusetts
Lawyers' Referral Panel Steering Committee).
83. Not only has there been no review by appellate courts, some counties and individu-
al Michigan judges have issued orders banning any reference to the decision or the
proceedings for any reason. See, e.g., Oakland County Form Order Grant-
ing/Denying Waiver of Parental Consent for Abortion (on file with authors). How
the procedures used by the courts in these cases affects the decision-making process
is discussed in more detail below.
84. Memorandum from Don Owens, President, Michigan Probate Court Judges'
Association to All Michigan Probate Judges (Apr. 11, 1991) (on file with authors)
(suggested questions attached, infra Appendix C).
19951
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER 6- LAW
Campbell and Benedick summarize this history:
[U]ntil the early 1980's, adolescent girls were compared to the
standard of male development theory. Young women were found
to be wanting and thus determined to be less developed and
mature than their male counterparts. Theorists and researchers
reflected a particular cultural and sociopolitical stance....
Broverman et al.'s study of behavioral norms for males, females
and adults illuminated a pervasive thrust in the practising clini-
cians that defined women as less than fully adult. When young
women claimed power and instrumentality, they were defined
(as by Douvan and Abelson's study) as ambiguously female or
not quite right. Because of this historic stance, young women
have suffered from a severe lack of validation of themselves and
the growth of the field of human development has been distort-
ed and stunted. 5
During the 1980s, research on women and girls revealed a separate
track of development from that of men and boys. Because earlier re-
searchers found differences between women and men, these researchers
concluded that, by definition, women were inferior to men. The history
of studying adolescent development solely through the experience of
85. Patricia Campbell & Elissa Benedik, Adolescent Development Research (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with authors). See generally Carol Gilligan, Adolescent
Development Reconsidered, in MAPPING THE MO.A. DOMAIN vii (Carol Gilligan et
al. eds., 1988).
While it is informative to read criticism of the biased approach taken by early
researchers, it is even more striking to read the primary sources themselves, which
treat girls and women as though they were an aberrant minority of the human race.
For example, in the course of discussing the personality development of all adoles-
cents, Jean Piaget suddenly begins to describe how girls are different:
Undoubtedly, the life plan of young girls is more dosely linked to person-
al relationships [than are boys'], and their hypothetico-deductive systems
take on the form more of a hierarchy of affective values than of a theoret-
ical system. Nevertheless, they are also concerned [as boys are] with a life
plan that goes far beyond reality. If their life plan is more concerned
[than boys'] with people, this is because the life for which they are pre-
paring is more concerned with specific interpersonal feelings than with
general emotions.
JEmN PAGLr, SIX PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDms 68 (David Elkind ed. & Anita Tenzer
trans., Random House, 1967). It becomes dear that the "adolescent" he had
previously been describing had been the male adolescent, the "norm."
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boys suggests that psychological evaluations of the maturity of girls
could be quite faulty if based on the biased research of the past.
The new research began to define adolescent girls' development as
both different and normal. The work of Carol Gilligan epitomized the
new direction in the study of teenage girls.8 6 Professor Gilligan, listen-
ing to women and men as they described themselves and their moral
conflicts, noticed a distinctive female voice. The female voice placed
special emphasis on relationships and described an emphasis on the
needs of individuals when discussing moral dilemmas (also referred to as
an emphasis on care). Men, on the other hand, tended to speak less of
relationships and to emphasize the application of rules or justice to
moral conflict.8 7 Discovering a "different" moral voice in women laid
the foundation for Professor Gilligan's criticism of prior psychological
research for its exclusion of this "voice."88
86. See generally CAROL GILLGAN, IN A DIFFERENr VoIcE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY
AND WOMEN'S DEvELOPMENT (1982); MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN (Carol
Gilligan et al. eds., 1988).
87. Gilligan states:
Two moral voices signalled different ways of thinking about what consti-
tutes a moral problem and how such problems can be addressed or
solved. In addition, two voices draw attention to the fact that a story can
be told from different angles and a situation seen in different lights. Like
ambiguous figure perception where the same picture can be seen as a vase
or as two faces, the basic elements of moral judgment-self, others, and
the relationship between them--can be organized in different ways,
depending on how "relationship" is imagined or construed. From the
perspective of someone seeking or loving justice, relationships are orga-
nized in terms of equality, symbolized by the balancing of scales. Moral
concerns focus on problems of oppression, problems stemming from
inequality, and the moral ideal is one of reciprocity or equal respect.
From the perspective of someone seeking or valuing care, relationship
connotes responsiveness or engagement, a resiliency of connection that is
symbolized by a network or web. Moral concerns focus on problems of
detachment, on disconnection or abandonment or indifference, and the
moral ideal is one of attention and response. Since all relationships can be
characterized both in terms of equality and in terms of attachment or
connection, all relationships-public and private--can be seen in two
ways and spoken of in two sets of terms. By adopting one or another
moral voice or standpoint, people can highlight problems that are associ-
ated with different kinds of vulnerability-to oppression or to abandon-
ment-and focus attention on different types of concern.
Gilligan, Adolescent Development Reconsidered, in MAPPING THE MoA.L DOMAIN,
supra note 85, at xvii-xviii.
88. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERnNT VOICE, supra note 86, at 1-4. See GILIGAN, IN A
DIFFERENT VoIcE, supra note 86, at 71-77 (results of a study by Gilligan of
women in the throes of the decision whether or not to have an abortion).
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In the past, psychological theory emphasized the "individuation"
process as normal development in teenagers. Adolescent maturity was
measured by the extent to which teens had separated from and become
independent of their parents. Professor Gilligan criticizes this view of
adolescent development as contrary to the human experience: "Psychol-
ogists in characterizing adolescence as a time of 'second individuation'
and in celebrating an identity that is 'self-wrought' have encouraged a
way of thinking in which the interdependence of human life and the
reliance of people on one another becomes either problematic or
tacit."89
Adolescent girls regularly reported concerns about maintaining not
only parental relationships, but other relationships as well. During
adolescence, they did not appear to be separating from their parents
and, thus, seemed developmentally behind their male counterparts.
Gilligan, in listening to teenagers, discovered that both boys and girls
could look at moral dilemmas in terms of relationships or in terms of
justice."0 She concluded that the previous emphasis on separation from
parents and on individuation denied the normal development of teenage
girls as well as an important aspect of the development of teenage
boys.91
In representing adolescent girls in parental consent hearings, we ask
our clients why they do not want to request parental consent for the
abortion. The girls regularly report a desire not to hurt their parents by
89. Gilligan, Adolescent Development Reconsidered, in MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN,
supra note 85, at xii (citations omitted).
To see self-sufficiency as the hallmark of maturity conveys a view of adult
life that is at odds with the human condition, a view that cannot sustain
the kinds of longterm commitments and involvements with other people
that are necessary for raising and educating a child or for citizenship in a
democratic society (see Arendt, 1958). The equation of development with
separation and of maturity with independence presumes a radical disconti-
nuity of generations and encourages a view of human experience that is
essentially divorced from history or time.
Gilligan, Adolescent Development Reconsidered, in MAPPING THE MoRAL DOMAIN,
supra note 85, at xii.
90. "The ability to sustain two perspectives that offer divergent views of a scene or to
tell a story from two different angles can be taken as a marker of cognitive and
moral growth in adolescence ...." Gilligan, Adolescent Development Reconsidered, in
MAPPING THE MoL. DomAN, supra note 85, at xxvi.
91. "Moral maturity then presumably entails an ability to see in at least two ways and
to speak at least two languages, and the relationship between justice and care
perspectives or voices becomes a key question for investigation." Gilligan, Adolescent
Development Reconsidered, in MAPPING THE MoRa. DOMAIN, supra note 85, at xx.
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telling them about the pregnancy. This reason for requesting a waiver
of parental consent might seem irrational to some. After all, if a girl
loves her parents and does not want to hurt them, their relationship is
probably healthy enough to survive the news of the pregnancy. As adult
onlookers, we might be tempted to deny a petition for waiver of paren-
tal rights, sympathizing with loving parents who, we believe, could help
their daughter in crisis. This is contrary to the teen's view. Her interest
in maintaining a stable and loving relationship with her parents may be
paramount in her eyes. The thought of confessing a pregnancy to the
parents she loves is possibly the worst fate imaginable. Does this desire
to shield her parents from her painful situation evidence maturity?
Professor Gilligan's work at least suggests that her desire to maintain
her relationship with her parents does not evidence a lack of maturity.
We can, therefore, draw caution from the discipline of psychology.
Asked to determine a teenage girl's maturity, a court enters into an
inquiry that is difficult and wrought with dangerous assumptions. The
work of modern psychological researchers, looking particularly at the
maturity of adolescent girls, suggests that both psychological experts and
judges asked to evaluate girls may be heavily influenced by definitions
of maturity based on the experiences of boys in our society. Our lack of
inquiry into the normal development of girls leaves us less able to
confidently assess their maturity.
Finally, the work of Professor Gilligan and others links maturity to
moral development and suggests that girls and boys, or women and
men, approach moral questions differently. Instead of believing that
there are clearly "right" and clearly "wrong" decisions (the traditional
male model of morality), women have more of a tendency to emphasize
responsibilities to the various persons in their lives. "After careful con-
sideration" of all choices, she makes the decision that she "believes will
result in the most good, or cause the least harm to all concerned."92 If,
in fact, men and women have a different way of approaching moral
questions, then the distance in reasoning between the young girl and an
older male judge is potentially very great. How is the judge equipped to
review the girl's ability to make a decision about abortion?
92. Kelly Flood, Decision for Abortion Is Mora" Women's Choices Often Based on Respon-
sibilities, LEINGroN-HERAL LEADER, Mar. 15, 1992, Special Section at 9. Profes-
sor Scarnecchia thanks her friend, the Reverend Kelly Flood, for this insight into
the morality of abortion.
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V. A FRAMEWORK FOR JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING
Within our proposed framework, we will suggest definitions for
"maturity" and "best interests," and then describe three ways in which
a court can limit its own discretion both to implement the statute and
to protect the minor's constitutional right to privacy. First, we suggest
that by limiting the scope of inquiry to factors that bear directly on
"maturity" and "best interests," the judge can appropriately narrow the
issue and better justify his or her decision. Second, we discuss
procedural rules that may aid in reaching "better" decisions. Finally, we
propose presumptions that, if adopted by the court, will simplify the
decision, make it more predictable, and still protect both the interests
of parents and the constitutional rights of the affected minor girls.
A. Working Definitions of 'Maturity" and "Best Interests"
The probate court must determine under the statute whether the
minor has the maturity "to make the decision regarding abortion inde-
pendently of her parents or legal guardian." 93 Therefore, the only issue
for the court is whether the teen is mature enough to make, on her
own, an informed decision about whether to undergo a particular
medical procedure. The court is not charged with finding that the teen
is the equivalent of an adult in all of her conduct or that she is mature
for all purposes.94 In fact, the court has no business determining
whether the teen is of good moral character or is mature for any
purpose other than for making the decision at hand. Certainly, the
court should not find that the teen who has made the decision to have
an abortion does not understand the consequences of her choice just
because the judge disagrees with that choice for religious, political, or
moral reasons. We conclude that, under the framework set out by
Bellotti II and the Michigan statute, all the court must find is whether
93. MIcH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 722.904 (West 1993).
94. In fact, as will be shown below, because the questions suggested by the Michigan
Probate Court Judges' Association really try to determine whether the teens are
mature for all purposes, and favor "good girls" who conform to societal rules, the
questions are more appropriately designed to determine who would make a better
mother rather than who has enough information to decide for herself whether to
bear a child.
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the teen has considered and understands the consequences (medical,
physical, and emotional) of her choice.95
Part of the determination that she is mature enough to make the
decision at hand is asking whether the minor is "well-enough informed"
to give consent to the medical procedure.96 This part of the inquiry
should focus on the information she has received about the medical
procedure and the medical consequences of undergoing-as well as not
undergoing-the abortion. Again, the baseline inquiry is whether she
has given the decision careful consideration.
If the teen is not found to be mature and well-informed enough to
make the decision on her own, the probate judge is to determine
whether the waiver would be in her "best interests." This inquiry is not
based on the minor's ability to make her own decision, but is based on
what is best for the teen. In defining "best interests," we believe the
judge should consider whether it is best for the teen to be able to make
the abortion decision independently, given all of the possible physical,
social, medical, and emotional consequences of being required to seek
parental consent. Although this determination is akin to a substituted
judgment for an incompetent, the inquiry must take into account the
minor's preference. 97 In no way should the best interests determination
take into account the best interests of the fetus or of the teen's parents,
or the judge's own bias or morals.9" The court cannot simply order that
it would be in the teen's best interests to ask her parents for consent
and that she, therefore, must do so.99 "Best interests" concerns more
than whether the teen will face physical abuse if she tells her parents
about the pregnancy. In our experience, however, the threat of physical
95. It is usefil to keep in mind throughout this analysis that the statute does not re-
quire the probate judges to give their "consent" to the teen's abortion; it merely is
a judicial determination that the teen can proceed with whatever choice she makes
about the pregnancy. See MIcH. CoMP. IAws ANN. § 722.904 (West 1993).
96. MIcH. COMP. LAws Am. § 722.904 (West 1993).
97. Cf Cruzan v. Missouri, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (dear statement of preference consid-
ered in determining what a now-incompetent woman would have wanted). See also
Suggested Guidelines for Standing Order 5-81 for the Massachusetts Superior
Court, Guideline 8 (on file with authors).
98. Indeed, some of the parental consent statutes explicitly charge that the parents who
are asked for consent must consider the teen's "best interests" in giving consent,
implying that the parents' own interests are irrelevant. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
112, § 12S (West 1991); 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 3206 (1983 & Supp. 1995).
99. See, e.g., In re Mary Moe, 423 N.E.2d 1038, 1042 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981).
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abuse is the factor most commonly considered in evaluating "best
interests."
In April 1991, the Michigan Probate Judge's Association developed
a list of recommended questions for determining whether the petition-
ing minor was mature and well informed, or whether it is in her best
interests to obtain the requested waiver.100 The questions, though
recommended and not required, appear to be an attempt to narrow the
judges' "unfettered personal choice."'0 Many of the "maturity" ques-
tions focus on helping the judge determine whether a teen is mature in
other areas of her life, or whether the teen's parents are abusive, and
thus whether not consulting her parents is in her "best interests."
Despite this admirable effort, most of the questions are irrelevant to the
issue of "maturity," and focus only on one aspect of "best interests."
Therefore, the use of the questions may allow a court to deny a petition
for the wrong reasons under the guise of following stated norms.
In light of the definitions of "maturity" and "best interests" we
propose above, we will review the proposed questions to show whether
they can in fact assist the court in making the statutory assessment.
B. Relevant and Irrelevant Areas of Inquiry
The Michigan Probate Judges' Association suggested twenty-nine
questions directed toward the issue of "maturity."102 Of these questions,
fewer than half seek information that is relevant to determining whether
the teen has carefully considered her choice. Many of the questions seek
to determine whether the teen is mature for all purposes, an inquiry
better suited to finding out whether she would make a good parent
than to whether she has made a considered, informed choice to have an
abortion. A teen need not be mature for all purposes to make this
informed choice."0 3 Other questions impose implicit judgments that
favor wealthier teens over their poorer counterparts. Our review of these
100. See Appendix C.
101. Milne, supra note 38, at 1.
102. Memorandum from Don Owens, President, Michigan probate Court Judges'
Association to All Michigan Probate Judges (Apr. 11, 1991) (on file with authors)
(suggested questions attached, infra Appendix C) [hereinafter Questiom].
103. If maturity for all purposes were the standard, then anyone who was not mature
enough under that standard would certainly not be mature enough to be forced to
carry a pregnancy to term and become a parent. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497
U.S. 417, 475 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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questions will refer to these different areas of inquiry and what they
show about the teen's maturity in light of our definition. In addition,
we will set out in Appendix D the relevant questions that a court
should ask.
What is the minor's birthdate? What grade in school has the minor
achieved? The minor's age is relevant for the same reason that the law
concludes that the ages eighteen or twenty-one carry with them the
presumption of maturity for certain life decisions. 4 Presumably, the
closer to age eighteen a teen is, the more apparent it is she should be
considered mature.'0 5 In Michigan, a teen over the age of sixteen is
beyond the age of consent in sexual matters. 106 In fact, as we will
indicate below, we believe that a sixteen or seventeen year old should be
considered to be presumptively mature for purposes of this decision.1 7
What are her academic grades? What is her school attendance record? The
test of maturity is not, nor should it be, a test of intelligence or confor-
mity to rules. Academic grades are generally accepted as a test of rela-
tive intelligence. Although comprehension of the ramifications of the
decision is part of our working definition of "maturity," and a more
intelligent teen may more quickly or more easily understand the ramifi-
cations of her decision, academic grades do not necessarily test that
understanding. Indeed, all that high academic grades and school atten-
dance may in fact test are conformity to rules, which may or may not
104. See, e.g., MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 722.4 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995) (emancipa-
tion occurs when a person reaches the age of 18); MICH. CONST. art. II, § 1 (voting
at age 21); MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 436.33b (West 1978 & Supp. 1995)
(minimum age to drink alcohol is 21); MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 333.6121 (West
1992) (certain medical consents); MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 551.51 (West 1988)
(minimum age of marriage is 16).
105. Despite this analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected a six-factor test proposed
by petitioner that would have presumed that minors aged 15 and older were mature
enough to make the decision without consulting a parent. In re Jane Doe 1, 566
N.E.2d 1181 (Ohio 1990). Cf City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 439 (1983) (addressing prohibitions on abortion for
girls under age 15 without consent of parent or guardian).
106. See MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 750.520b-d (West 1991).
107. When it comes to abortion, some state legislatures are determined to treat all
women, no matter what their age, as presumptively too "immature" to give in-
formed consent. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S.
Cr. 2791 (1992); MIcH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 333.17015(3) (West Supp. 1995)
(requiring a 24-hour waiting period before a physician can perform an abortion on
a woman of any age).
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be indicative of whether a teen understands the consequences of her
choice to undergo an abortion without consulting her parents. The
question is not whether she is smart and able to do schoolwork, but
whether she has thought about and understands her choice. Other
questions are relevant to and probe that understanding more directly.
Does she participate in any extracurricular activities? If so, what are they?
What is her employment history? What are her responsibilities in her own
home and residence? What is her driving record? All of these questions
seem to be trying to determine whether the teen is mature for all
purposes, rather than trying to determine whether she is able to make
the decision on her own. Whether she sweeps her room every week or
has never gotten a speeding ticket has nothing to do with whether she
understands the consequences of her choice.
Nor does whether a teen participates in any extracurricular activi-
ties have anything to do with whether she is informed enough to
understand the ramifications of her decision. This question unfairly
favors teens who are able to participate in after-school activities. This
question may also lead to inaccurate information, in that several of our
clients had been' forced to drop their extracurricular activities due to
their pregnancies, so when first asked to describe their activities they
responded "none." Although the question may elicit what the teen
recognizes as at least one of the personal consequences of her choice
(i.e., if she goes on with the pregnancy she may have to give up college
or her job or cheerleading or basketball), the question itself is irrelevant
to determining maturity for this issue.
What are her general plans for her fiture? Many of the teens that we
have represented have expressed an understanding and thoughtful
consideration of the consequences of having a baby as a teenager, saying
things like "I'm too young to take care of a baby"; "I would have to
give up college"; "I would lose my job"; "My parents would kick me
out of the house and I would have no place to go."' Such considered
judgment of the consequences of her choice is evidence that a teen has
thought through her choice, but plans or lack of them is not determi-
native of maturity. Instead, the court can simply ask her in a straight-
108. The consequences to the teen of not having the abortion and becoming a single
parent are grave. The Michigan study shows that if she has the child, she and the
child will likely fall into poverty and may never get out of it. See generally Duncan
& Hoffian, supra note 6.
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forward manner whether she has thought about the personal conse-
quences of her decision to have an abortion.
What is her financial situation? Does the minor have a physician? Has her
physician made a recommendation to the minor regarding the minor's
abortion? Would there be any foreseeable medical complications in this case
according to the physician?109 These questions unfairly favor well-to-do
teens over poorer teens who may not have any income or a regular
physician. ' To the extent that these questions are a way for the judge
to determine whether the teen has enough information to give knowing
and considered consent, they are vague and made redundant by other
questions suggested by the Probate Judges' Association.
If the unstated question here is whether the teen has made arrange-
ments to pay for the abortion and aftercare procedures, thus determin-
ing whether she understands the ramifications of her decision, then this
is the question that should be asked. The teen's financial situation and
whether she can afford regular medical care is irrelevant.
What is her prior court involvement, if any? This question is hopelessly
vague. Does it include being a testifying witness? Having filed for
divorce? To the extent that this question is attempting to determine
whether the teen has a criminal or juvenile record, it is irrelevant. The
teen's record has nothing to do with her ability to understand the
ramifications of her decision. To the extent that the question is seeking
information about any other court involvement, such as being a wit-
ness, it is still irrelevant. Even if the minor is testifying at trial as a
victim of the rape that resulted in the pregnancy for which she is
seeking the abortion, that testimony has nothing to do with whether
the teen is able to make an informed decision.
What is her mental health record, if any? What is the minor's health
history, including use of medications, controlled substances and alcohol? The
109. The questions regarding the doctor's recommendations and concerns about com-
plications seem to be more of a test of whether the abortion is in the teen's "best
interests," rather than whether she (not her doctor) understands the consequences of
her choice.
110. See Donovan, supra note 33, at 262 (indicating that poorer teens do not use the by-
pass process as much as more well-to-do teens). Perhaps one reason poorer teens do
not use the process as often is an inherent class bias in the system. See also Robert
W. Blum et al., Factors Associated with the Use of Court Bypass by Minors to Obtain
Abortions, 22 FAm. PLAN. PERsP. 158 (1990).
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only relevant inquiry regarding mental health is whether there is any
mental condition that would render the minor unable to understand
the consequences of her choice. The question regarding her mental
health record is too broad and overly intrusive. It is thus irrelevant.
The minor's physical health history is irrelevant to determining
maturity, and like the employment and extracurricular activities ques-
tions, is in part really directed to the possible consequences that might
befall the teen as a result of her decision. It is up to the medical staff
involved, not the court, to make the determination that an abortion
should not be performed due to physical health concerns.
111
The second part of the question, whether the teen has used or
abused controlled substances or alcohol, is only relevant to whether she
understands the consequences of her choice.11 2 An analogous situation is
a criminal defendant's waiver of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights
when entering a guilty plea." 3 There, the court makes careful inquiry
into the basis for the plea, and informs the defendant that he is waiving
his right to confront witnesses, to hold the state to its burden of proof,
and to not incriminate himself, among other things. If a defendant
were intoxicated at the time he made his plea, this fact could negate the
plea, because he may not have understood the consequences of his
choice to waive his constitutional rights. Here, the only relevance a
teen's use or abuse of alcohol may have is if it either affects her ability
to understand the consequences of her choice at the time she signs the
doctor's consent form, or affects her ability to testify at the bypass
hearing.
What are the minor's sources of information regarding abortion? This
question is relevant to the extent that it relates to the issue of informed
111. Both her physical and mental health histories are potentially relevant to the "best
interests" inquiry. See Questions, supra note 102; infra Appendix C.
112. If the teen abuses alcohol or drugs, it certainly seems incongruous to deny the peti-
tion, effectively forcing a drug-addicted woman to have a baby.
113. Although only the most ardent anti-abortion advocates would embrace the analogy
of a pregnant teen seeking an abortion to a guilty criminal defendant, the parental
consent law puts both in a similar situation. Both have to come to the court and
admit guilt for something society does not sanction (out-of-wedlock sex or criminal
conduct), and both have to rely on the judge for the ruling that will determine
much of the course of the rest of their lives. The difference, however, is that the
judge's discretion in the criminal case is limited in Michigan by strict sentencing
guidelines. MIcH. CoM'. LAws ANN. § 769.34 (West Supp. 1995). As has been
described above, there is no limit whatsoever on the judges' discretion in parental
consent cases.
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consent. The sources of information, though, are not as important as the
information that the teen has and her understanding of that informa-
tion.114 The court's inquiry here could be narrowed to the question of
whether the teen feels that she has enough information concerning the
medical, physical, and emotional ramifications of abortion to make her
own choice.
Is the information accurate and thorough? Although this inquiry goes
directly to the issue of informed consent, it raises the issue of whether
the teen has to prove that the information is accurate and thorough.
No other medical informed consent requires the patient to prove that
the information relied on in giving consent meets this criteria; this
burden is on the medical professional who will perform the procedure.
Here, the presumption should be that if the minor has obtained the
information from a licensed doctor or clinic, the information is accurate
and thorough." 5 To determine whether the teen who has been to a
licensed clinic or physician has all the information she needs, the better
question would be to ask whether she feels she has enough information
to make the decision.
Has the minor received counseling from anyone regarding abortion, and if
so, with whom? Does she feel she needs more counseling regarding her
pregnancy and request for an abortion? If the judge is concerned about
whether the teen has enough information, the judge should ask whether
she feels she is able to make an informed choice. One thing that the
114. One of the examples of a source of information that is irrelevant in and of itself is
the fact that the teen may have already had an abortion. The court may use the fact
that the teen has had an abortion to determine whether she understands the proce-
dure and thus the consequences of her choice, but it would be wrong for the court
to turn the inquiry into an evaluation of the teen's morality. Asking whether the
teen previously had an abortion permits a judge to say the teen is immature when
what he means is that she is, in his view, immoral.
For example, in a case Professor Field handled, the 17-year-old teen was seeking
a bypass for her second abortion within six months. The court found her mature
enough to make the decision on her own, noting that she was familiar with the
abortion procedure. As a precautionary, educational measure, the court expressed
concerns for the teen's health and wanted to know whether the teen was going to
use protection against unwanted pregnancies in the future. Whether the teen did so
or not was not determinative of the court's finding of "maturity." Thus the court
did not turn the inquiry into a moral evaluation, but rather an informational one.
115. For example, in the cases we have handled under Michigan's law, the courts have
presumed that if the teen got information from a licensed clinic, then she had been
appropriately advised of the medical procedures and consequences.
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judge should not do is require the teen to be counseled by a particular
person or counselor. The decision whether to have an abortion is the
teen's choice, not a choice that should be imposed on her by Bethany
Christian Services 116 or any other agency or person. There is no provi-
sion in the statute that permits the court to order counseling, particu-
larly religious counseling, or any other services for the minor." 7
How would the minor go about obtaining an abortion? What arrangements
would the minor make to have the abortion performed? Does the minor
understand the various options or alternatives to abortion? Has she consid-
ered them? Have both abortion procedures and child birth procedures
together with the medical risks been explained to her? Have the aftercare
procedures been explained and understood? Has the minor been informed
and does she understand what to do if medical complications occur? Has the
minor been counseled as to possible emotional and psychological problems
she may experience after the abortion or child birth? How would she deal
with such problems if any? Has the minor been promised anything from
anyone if she would have the abortion? Has the minor been threatened with
any action or inaction if she does not have the abortion?
These are the most relevant questions for determining maturity.
Each one goes directly to the issue of whether the teen is well informed
and understands the medical, emotional, and physical ramifications of
her decision. These questions also address the issue of whether the teen
is making her own decision.
In asking these questions, the judge should not require the teen to
provide a detailed explanation of the counseling she has undergone and
the information she has been given. In criminal pleas, judges do not
require a thorough explanation from the defendant of the Fifth or Sixth
116. But ef Willis, supra note 79 ("Bethany Christian Services is the only full service
agency in Van Buren County that counsels and works with unwed pregnant minors
.... I really feel that before the minor child makes such a crucial decision that she
should counsel with a professional agency regarding all her possible options.").
117. This omission of services for the minor highlights the true intent of the statute: not
to help pregnant minors but to deter abortions. The Michigan Legislature, consider-
ing an earlier form of the Act, affirmatively rejected a substitute bill that would
have provided direct assistance to pregnant teens. Supra note 60.
118. These questions are redundant because they elicit information gathered through
other questions. Simply by being in court the minor has already taken the first step
and therefore demonstrated that she knows how to "go about obtaining an abor-
tion" by asking for a waiver of parental consent. Cf Beilotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622
(1979) (Bellorti II).
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Amendment; they merely ask whether the defendant understands the
rights he is waiving by pleading guilty. With the criminal defendant,
the judge assumes that the defendant's attorney adequately explained
the law. Similarly, in parental consent cases, the judge should assume
that a health-care provider will adequately explain the medical conse-
quences.
In addition to the issues suggested by the questions discussed
above, in our experience, the court has been interested in why the teen
has not told her parents; whether she was using birth control at the
time she got pregnant; and whether she intends to use birth control to
avoid this problem in the future. Like the questions regarding jobs,
extracurricular activities, and general plans for the future, these areas of
inquiry are relevant only to the extent that they can help the court
determine whether the teen has thought about the consequences of her
decision. Although whether a teen is using birth control might be
determinative of maturity for other purposes, it is not determinative of
maturity for purposes of this statute." 9
The Probate Judges' Association also proposed questions directed
to the "best interests" inquiry120 The majority of those questions are
directed to whether there has been abuse, or whether there is the
119. It is questionable -whether use of birth control is determinative in any way of
"maturity" for all purposes when teens are compared with one another. The reality
of teens' ignorance about sex and birth control is that few teens understand birth
control or how to use it and are reluctant to introduce its use in a relationship for
fear of being thought "easy." See Kisker, supra note 78, at 84. Relying on whether
a teen uses birth control as a basis for determining "maturity' has the potential of
punishing the majority of teens who are merely the victims of American society's
avoidance of realistic discussions about sex. While we agree that it may be useful for
the court to use the hearing as an opportunity to remind the teen that birth control
is necessary to prevent an unwanted pregnancy, whether the teen has been pregnant
previously or was using birth control at the time she got pregnant should not be a
determining factor under either the "maturity" or "best interests" standard.
120. Those questions are: What is the minor's relationship with her mother, father, or
her guardian? With whom does the minor reside? Who has legal custody of the
minor? Has the minor considered a petition for emancipation? Who does the minor
usually turn to for advice? What is the person's advice on this issue of abortion, if
any? Does the minor feel she should not inform a parent or guardian about her
pregnancy and request for this waiver and, if so, why? How do each of her parents
or guardians generally respond when confronted with actions of the minor that
displease them? What does the minor believe would occur if she discussed her
pregnancy and desire for an abortion with either parent or guardian? What evidence
regarding past behavior of the parents or guardians is there that would show harm
would come to the minor if parental or guardians' consent were requested? Ques-
tions, supra note 102; infra Appendix C.
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potential for abuse if the minor was to consult her parents.'21 The "best
interests" determination, however, is more than a finding of whether
the teen will be subjected to physical abuse if she consults her parents.
In determining "best interests," the court should look not only at her
reasons for not consulting with her parents, but also at what the medi-
cal, emotional, physical, and social consequences of requiring her to
seek parental consent would be. 12
2
Of course, there is overlap between some of the questions desig-
nated as "best interests" questions and some designated as "maturity"
questions. One area where there seems to be overlap is the proposed
"best interests" question, "Has the minor considered a petition for
emancipation?"" 3 In Michigan, an emancipated teen is not required to
obtain parental consent, 24 presumably because where an emancipation
petition has been granted, the court has determined that the teen has
demonstrated an ability, and thus earned the right, to make her own
life decisions.15
Professor Field has handled two cases with similar facts that illus-
trate the potential overlap between "best interests" and "maturity"
inquiries. Both teens were already parents of infants and were pregnant
by the men who had fathered their first child. Both were receiving
public assistance and had thought about the consequences of having a
second child and decided against it. Both had received thorough coun-
seling from Planned Parenthood about the abortion procedure and
understood the procedure. Both had distant and poor relationships with
their own mothers and no relationships at all with their own fathers.
121. Questions, supra note 102; infia Appendix C.
122. For example, teens who are faced with the prospect of telling their parents that they
are pregnant in order to obtain consent for abortion and cannot do so may opt for
unsafe, illegal abortions or suicide. Cf Laille Gabinet, Attempted Suicide in Respone
to Refisal of Elective Abortion, 1984 OHIO ST. MED. J. 801-803. See, e.g., Bella
English, Mindless Law, Needless Death, BosToN GLOBE, August 22, 1990, at 29
(describing death of Indiana teen Becky Bell from illegal abortion).
123. A petition for emancipation is not a viable alternative for a bypass hearing given the
amount of time necessary for obtaining an order of emancipation. In addition,
under Michigan law, parents must be notified of the emancipation petition, thus
defeating the purpose of the judicial bypass process. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§ 722.4a(3) (West 1993).
124. MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 722.902(c) (West 1993 & Supp. 1995).
125. Interestingly, the Michigan statute does not exempt married teens from the parental
consent requirement, but Michigan law provides for the emancipation of married
minors, thus freeing them from the Act's parental consent requirement. MICH.
COMP. LAws ANN. § 722.4(2)(a) (West 1993 & Supp. 1995).
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One of the teens was seventeen, almost eighteen; the other was fifteen,
almost sixteen. The only really distinguishing factor besides age was that
the older teen was living on her own, while the younger teen lived with
her grandmother. The court granted both petitions but, despite the
similarities, based each decision on different grounds. The seventeen
year old was found to be mature under the statute, but the fifteen year
old's petition was granted because it was found to be in her "best
interests."
In Appendix D, we suggest questions that may more closely bear
on the issues of "maturity" and "best interests" of a minor girl. The
"best interests" inquiry, which tends to be more intrusive, is unneces-
sary if the court finds the girl mature. Therefore, the court should limit
its initial inquiry to "maturity."
Much of the court's inquiry in some of the cases we have handled
has been accomplished through court caseworkers, who interview the
teen and make recommendations to the court concerning whether the
waiver should be granted. We will now discuss how different court
procedures in these cases impact the court's decisions.
C. Procedural Limitations on Discretion
One limit on the court's discretion in these cases is appellate
review. As noted above, very few cases are reviewed because of the time
constraints inherent in the process. The Michigan Court Rules set strict
time limits, recognizing that a time delay can effectively moot the
decision. If petitions are granted, no matter how inappropriate the
court's inquiry may have been, there will be no appellate review. In
addition, court-issued "gag" orders effectively shield what could be
court abuses. Such orders also undermine public review of courts by
prohibiting anyone from reporting anything that occurs in the court,
even if the minor's confidentiality is not threatened by revealing statisti-
cal or demographic information. Although we are concerned with
protecting the minor's confidentiality, such protection does not require
total nondisclosure of the occurrence of hearings or the court's conduct
during hearings. The Michigan Supreme Court should investigate and
forbid any attempts to hide information about the experience of liti-
gants under this statute except when required to protect the confidenti-
ality of individual girls.
Some Michigan courts have involved experienced social workers in
the process, using these individuals as almost substitute guardians ad
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litem who make a recommendation to the judge about whether the teen
is mature or whether the waiver is in the teen's "best interests." How-
ever, this additional person does not necessarily serve as a limit on the
judge's discretion; the social worker's recommendation can be as easily
influenced by his or her own bias and morals as can the judge's deci-
sion. Also, where the social worker is employed by the court, his or her
recommendation may easily be influenced by what he or she believes
are the judge's own biases and moral beliefs.
The use of a social worker can be analogized to statutes that per-
mit a medical doctor (other than the one performing the abortion) to
determine "best interests" or "maturity."26 Although that system elimi-
nates the judicial discretion concerns, it does not eliminate the danger
inherent in letting someone other than the teen make a decision that
profoundly affects her life. By requiring a second interview, the use of a
doctor or a social worker in this process allows a teen's life to be scruti-
nized by yet another person. We are not convinced that the social
worker's recommendation is necessary, provided that the minor is
represented by counsel. 2 7
Although procedures can serve to rein in unfettered discretion,
they are not a complete solution. Below, we recommend presumptions
that will consider proper factors and decrease the likelihood that the
decision will be influenced by a judge's own bias or moral beliefs.
D. Proposed Presumptions of 'Maturity"
and "Best Interests"
We propose that the only real way to limit a court's discretion in
a manner consistent with a minor's constitutional rights is to apply
presumptions that are consistent with the purpose of the law and that
flow out of the psychological literature discussed above. We propose
presumptions based on the nature of the decision, age, source of infor-
mation, and social factors involved in each case.
A judge should presume maturity and be required to rebut that
presumption in any decision denying a waiver. In determining whether
to grant a minor girl's petition for waiver of parental consent, a trial
126. E.g., W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-3(c) (1995).
127. Cf MxcH. ComP. LAws ANN. § 722.904(2)(a)(ii) (West 1993) (requiring the
probate court to notify minor of right to a court-appointed attorney or guardian ad
item).
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judge decides whether the girl will or will not have the same constitu-
tional protection as an adult woman.1 28 Depending on the court's
decision, the minor girl will either exercise her constitutional right to
decide whether to have a child, or she must completely relinquish to
her parents her constitutional right to decide. It is an either/or situa-
tion; the teen sits on a fence between full constitutional protection and
none. When a person's right to protected freedoms is so clearly in
question and when the question is to be decided at the court's discre-
tion, the court should generally presume in favor of granting the consti-
tutional right.
Most teens who are not independent enough to make a decision
on their own do consult their parents. 129 Therefore, those who come to
court to seek a bypass should be presumed mature. Indeed, finding out
about the need for a bypass and preparing for and coming to court are
tasks that require thought, perseverance, organizational skills, and the
ability to handle the consequences of one's conduct. That alone may be
evidence of maturity. Therefore, if a judge finds what he or she believes
to be equal evidence of maturity and of immaturity, then the court
should grant the petition waiving parental consent.
Presumptions should also be based on age. For instance, teens
sixteen and over should be presumed mature. These teens are at an
advanced level of cognitive development and are at the age of consent
for sex. A teen that age also has limited power to consent to other life
decisions such as marriage. 3 ' If a teen sixteen or over marries without
parental consent, the marriage is not automatically void.'3 Thus, con-
trary to current law, a teen who is married should be presumed to be
mature enough to make the abortion decision on her own. Certainly, a
teen who has a child and can make the entire range of medical deci-
sions for her child without a specific finding of "maturity" should be
presumed mature enough to make the abortion decision for herself.
As far as the "best interests" inquiry is concerned, 32 a waiver
128. See generally Bellorti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979) (Bellotd II).
129. Raye Hudson Rosen, Adolescent Pregnany Decision-Making: Are Parents Important?,
15 ADOimSCENCE 23, 52 (Spring 1980).
130. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 445 (1990).
131. Cf MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 551.51 (West 1988) (voiding marriages of persons
under 16).
132. Although the "best interests" inquiry under the, statute is apparently limited to
whether it is in the teen's "best interests" not to consult her parents about the
decision, some of the social realities demonstrate that it is generally not in a teen's
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should be presumed to be in a teen's "best interests" if she is under
thirteen. It should be presumed to be in a younger teen's "best inter-
ests" because of the higher risks of carrying a pregnancy to term. In
Michigan, a pregnant teen who is under age thirteen is per se the
victim of rape. 33 If the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest, the
waiver should be deemed in the teen's "best interests," regardless of
age.13
4
With the middle group of teens, the thirteen through fifteen year
olds, it is much more difficult to apply presumptions based on age. For
this age group, it would be appropriate to use the relevant questions set
out in Appendix D. During that inquiry, however, the judge should
keep in mind that coming to court evidences "maturity" and, with
respect to the best interests inquiry, the facts set out in footnote 132
favor granting the petition.
In addition, it should be presumed that, if the teen has obtained
information from a licensed medical professional or clinic, the informa-
tion was accurate and thorough. A medical professional is not likely to
undertake a medical procedure such as an abortion without being sure
to obtain informed consent.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court permits states to restrict a minor's right to
make her own determination as to whether she should have an abortion
and directs that a judicial bypass process is necessarily part of such a
restriction. The Supreme Court did nothing, however, to help state
courts make the determination either that a minor is "mature" enough
to make the abortion decision on her own or that making the abortion
decision without consulting her parents would be in her "best interests."
"best interests" to carry a pregnancy to term. For example, teenage mothers and
their children plunge into poverty and often do not get out. See Duncan &
Hoffman, supra note 6, at 9. And carrying a pregnancy to term by an "immature"
mother against her will is inconsistent with her "best interests." Hodgson, 497 U.S.
at 475 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
133. MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 750.520b-c (West 1991).
134. The Michigan legislature defeated several attempts to amend the Act to allow an
exception in cases of rape or incest. JouRNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF
MICHIGAN at 219 (Feb. 14, 1990); JouRNAL OF THE Housa OF THE STATE OF
MICHIGAN at 2882 (Dec. 6, 1989); JouRNAL. OF THE HousE oF THE STATE OF
MICHIGAN at 2884 (Dec. 6, 1989); JouRNAL oF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF
MICHIGAN at 2135-56 (Oct. 25, 1989).
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None of the states that use the judicial bypass process have given their
judges any practical guidance much beyond the few statements by the
Supreme Court. Essentially, whether a minor's petition for a waiver of
parental consent should be granted is a determination left to the unfet-
tered discretion of each judge.
Our proposal sets out guidelines for courts faced with making the
determination of whether a teen is mature based on the nature of the
teen's decision and the psychology and sociology of the decision-making
process itself. Yet even with these guidelines, the "maturity" decision is
one that is difficult, if not impossible, for judges to make. Even apply-
ing our proposed guidelines, it is doubtful that the Michigan statute's
stated goal, restoration of parental rights, is furthered by the parental
consent/judicial bypass process. The potential resultant harm to
teenagers forced to go through this process, however, is enormous.
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APPENDIX A
PARENTAL RIGHTS RESTORATION ACT
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.9OI-.9o8
722.901 Short title
Section 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as "the
parental rights restoration act".
722.902 Definitions
Section 2. As used in this act
(a) "Abortion" means the intentional use of an instrument, drug,
or other substance or device to terminate a woman's pregnancy for a
purpose other than to increase the probability of a live birth, to pre-
serve the life or health of the child after live birth, or to remove a dead
fetus. Abortion does not include the use or prescription of a drug or
device intended as a contraceptive.
(b) "Emergency" means a situation in which continuation of the
pregnancy of the minor would create an immediate threat and grave
risk to the life of the minor, as certified in writing by a physician.
(c) "Minor" means a person under the age of 18 years who is not
emancipated pursuant to section 4 of Act No. 293 of the Public Acts of
1968, being section 722.4 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.
(d) "Next friend" means a person who is not 1 of the following:
(i) A physician who performs abortions.
(ii) A person who is employed by, or received financial consider-
ation from, a physician who performs abortions or an organization that
provides abortions or abortion counseling and referral services.
(iii) A person who serves as a board member or volunteer to an
organization that provides abortions or abortion counseling and referral
services.
722.903 Abortion for minor; written consent; petition to court for
waiver of parental consent
Section 3. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this act, a person
shall not perform an abortion on a minor without first obtaining the
written consent of the minor and 1 of the parents or the legal guardian
of the minor.
(2) If the parent or legal guardian is not available or refuses to give
his or her consent, or if the minor elects not to seek consent of a
parent or the legal guardian, the minor may petition the probate court
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pursuant to section 4 for a waiver of the parental consent requirements
of this section.
722.904 Probate court jurisdiction of petition for waiver of parental
consent; proceedings; appeal; confidentiality; reports of suspected abuse
Section 4. (1) The probate court has jurisdiction of proceedings
related to a minor's petition for a waiver of parental consent.
(2) Proceedings held pursuant to this act shall be completed with
confidential and sufficient expedition to provide self-consent to an
abortion, in accordance with all the following:
(a) The probate court shall, upon its first contact with a minor
seeking a waiver of parental consent under this act, provide the minor
with notice of the minor's right to all of the following:
(i) Confidentiality of the proceedings, including the right to use
initials in the petition.
(ii) Court appointment of an attorney or guardian ad litem.
(iii) Assistance with preparing and filing the petition.
(b) A minor may file a petition for waiver of parental consent in
the probate court of the county in which the minor resides. For pur-
poses of this act, the county in which the minor resides means the
county in which the minor's residence is located or the county in which
the minor is found.
(c) Upon request of the minor, the probate court shall provide the
minor with assistance in preparing and filing the petition for waiver of
parental consent.
(d) A minor may file a petition for waiver of parental consent
under this act on her own behalf or through a next friend. The minor
may use initials or some other means of assuring confidentiality in this
petition.
(e) Upon request of the minor, the probate court shall appoint an
attorney or guardian ad litem within 24 hours to represent the minor in
proceedings under this section.
(0 A minor is not required to pay a fee for proceedings under this
section.
(g) A hearing on a petition for waiver of parental consent under
this act shall be held within 72 hours, excluding Sundays and holidays,
after the petition is filed and shall be closed to the public. All records of
proceedings related to the petition for waiver of parental consent under
this act are confidential.
(h) The probate court that hears the petition for waiver of parental
consent shall issue and make part of the confidential record its specific
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findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its ruling either on
record or in a written opinion.
(i) A written order granting or denying a petition for waiver of
parental consent filed pursuant to this act shall be issued within 48
hours, excluding Sundays and holidays, after the hearing on the petition
is held.
(3) The probate court shall grant a waiver of parental consent if it
finds either of the following:
(a) The minor is sufficiently mature and well-enough informed to
make the decision regarding abortion independently of her parents or
legal guardian.
(b) The waiver would be in the best interests of the minor.
(4) A minor who is denied a waiver under this section may appeal
the probate court's decision to the court of appeals. Appeal proceedings
shall be expedited and. confidential. The notice of appeal shall be filed
within 24 hours of the issuance of the order denying the petition. The
appeal shall be perfected within 72 hours, excluding Sundays and
holidays, from the filing of the notice of appeal.
(5) The confidentiality requirements of this section do not prevent
the probate court from reporting suspected child abuse under section 4
of the child protection law, Act No. 238 of the Public Acts of 1975,
being section 722.624 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.
(6) If the minor who is seeking a waiver of parental consent reveals
to the probate court that she is a victim of sexual abuse, and that her
pregnancy is, or may be, the result of sexual abuse, the probate court
shall immediately do all of the following:
(a) Report the suspected sexual abuse to the department of social
services or a law enforcement agency pursuant to the child protection
law, Act No. 238 of the Public Acts of 1975, being sections 722.621 to
722.636 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.
(b) Inform the minor that there are laws designed to protect her,
including all of the following provisions of chapter XIIA of the probate
code, Act No. 288 of the Public Acts of 1939, being sections 712A.1 to
712A.28 of the Michigan Compiled Laws:
(i) That a law enforcement officer may without court order take
the minor into temporary protective custody if, after investigation, the
officer has reasonable grounds to conclude that the minor's health,
safety, or welfare would be endangered by leaving her in the custody of
her parent or legal guardian.
(ii) That the juvenile division of the probate court may, upon
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learning of the suspected sexual abuse, immediately hold a preliminary
inquiry to determine whether a petition for court jurisdiction should be
filed or whether other action should be taken.
(iii) That the juvenile court shall appoint an attorney to represent
the minor in protective proceedings.
(iv) That after a petition has been filed, the juvenile court may
order that the minor be placed with someone other than her parent or
legal guardian pending trial or further court order if such placement is
necessary to avoid substantial risk to the minor's life, physical health, or
mental well-being.
(7) As used in this section, "child abuse" and "sexual abuse" mean
those terms as defined in section 2 of the child protection law, Act No.
238 of the Public Acts of 1975, being section 722.622 of the Michigan
Compiled Laws.
722.905 Emergency abortion
Section 5. The requirements of Section 3 do not apply to an
abortion performed pursuant to an emergency.
722.906 Applicability to nonresidents
Section 6. The requirements of this act apply regardless of whether
the minor is a resident of this state.
722.907 Violation of act, misdemeanor; civil action, damages
Section 7. (1) A person who intentionally performs an abortion in
violation of this act is guilty of a misdemeanor.
(2) A person's failure to obtain either parental consent pursuant to
this act or a copy of a waiver granted under section 4 before perform-
ing an abortion on a minor is prima facie evidence in appropriate civil
actions of his or her failure to obtain informed consent to perform the
abortion or of his or her interference with family relations. A court shall
not construe the law of this state to preclude exemplary damages in a
civil action related to violations of this act.
722.908 Right to abortion not created
Section 8. (1) This act does not create a right to an abortion.
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of this act, a person shall
not perform an abortion that is prohibited by law.
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APPENDIX B
STATES WITH PARENTAL CONSENT OR NOTIFICATION LAWS
Alabama: ALA. CODE § 26-21-3 (1992) (consent); Alaska: ALASKA
STAT. § 18.16.010 (1994) (one parent consent; no bypass procedure);
Arizona: Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152 (1993) (consent); Arkan-
sas: ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-801 et seq. (Michie 1991) (two parent
notice); California: CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25958 (West
Supp. 1995) (consent); Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-101 et seq.
(1986 & Supp. 1994) (consent); Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24,
§ 1790 (1987 & Supp. 1994) (two parent consent); Georgia: GA.
CODE ANN. § 15-11-112 (1994) (notice); Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 18- '
609 (1987) (notice); Illinois: ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 720, para. 520-4
(1994) (two parent notice); Kentucky: Ky. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 311.732
(Michie/Bobbs-Merril 1990 & Supp. 1994) (consent); Louisiana: LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.5 (West 1992) (consent); Maine: ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1597-A (West 1992 & Supp. 1994) (con-
sent); Maryland: MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-103 (1990)
(one parent notice); Massachusetts: MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 112, § 12S
(Law Co-op. 1991) (consent); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 144.343 (West 1989) (notice); Mississippi: Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 41-41-53 (1993) (consent); Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028
(Vernon 1983 & Supp. 1995) (consent); Montana: MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 50-20-107 (1993) (notice); Nevada: NEv. REV. STAT. § 442.255
(1991) (one parent notice); North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-02.1-03.1 (1991) (consent); Ohio: OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2919.12 (Anderson 1993) (notice; permits notice to a sibling over 21
in lieu of parent); Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, § 3206 (1983
& Supp. 1995) (consent); Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAws. § 23-4.7-6
(1989) (consent); South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-31 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1994) (consent); South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 34-23A-7 (1994) (consent); Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 37-10-303 (1991) (consent); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304.
(1995) (notice; no bypass procedure); Virginia: VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-76 (Michie 1988) (consent); Washington: WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 9.02.070 (West 1988) (consent); West Virginia: W. VA. CODE
§ 16-2F-3 (1995) (one parent notice); Wisconsin: Wis. STAT. § 48.375
(1992) (parental notification encouraged but not required); Wyoming:
Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-118 (1994) (one parent notice).
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APPENDIX C
MICHIGAN PROBATE JUDGES ASSOCIATION,
QUESTIONNAIRE TO ASSIST THE COURT
REGARDING WAIVER OF PARENTAL CONSENT
Issue L Is the minor sufficiently mature and well-enough informed to
make the decision regarding abortion independently of parent(s) or legal
guardian?
What is the minor's birhdate?
What grade in school has the minor achieved?
What are her academic grades?
What is her school attendance record?
Does she participate in any school activities? If so what are they?
Does she participate in any extracurricular activities? If so what are
they?
What is her employment history?
What is her financial situation?
What are her responsibilities in her home and residence?
What is her driving record?
What is her prior court involvement, if any?
What is her mental health record, if any?
'What are her general plans for her future?
What are the minor's sources of information regarding abortion?
Is the information accurate and thorough?
Has the minor received counseling from anyone regarding abortion and
if so, with whom?
Does she feel that she needs more counseling regarding her pregnancy
and request for an abortion?
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Does the minor understand the options or alternatives to abortion? Has
she considered them?
How would the minor go about obtaining an abortion?
What is the minor's health history, including use of medications, con-
trolled substances and alcohol?
Does the minor have a physician?
Has the physician made a recommendation to the minor regarding the
minor's abortion?
Would there be any foreseeable medical complications in this case
according to the physician?
Have both abortion procedures and child birth procedures together
with the medical risks been explained to her?
Have the aftercare procedures been explained and understood?
Has the minor been informed and does she understand what to do if
medical complications occur?
Has the minor been counseled as to the possible emotional and psycho-
logical problems she may experience after the abortion or child birth?
How would she deal with such problems if any?
What arrangements would the minor make to have the abortion per-
formed?
Has the minor been promised anything from anyone if she would have
the abortion?
Has the minor been threatened with any action or inaction if she does
not have the abortion?
Issue IL Is it in the best interests of the minor to grant the waiver of
parental consent?
What is the minor's relationship with her mother, father, or her guard-
ian?
With whom does the minor reside?
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Who has legal custody of the minor?
Has the minor considered a petition for emancipation?
Who does the minor usually turn to for advice?
What is the person's advice on this issue of abortion, if any?
Does the minor feel she should not inform a parent or guardian about
her pregnancy and request for this waiver and if so, why?
How do each of her parents or guardians generally respond when
confronted with actions of the minor which displease them?
What does the minor believe would occur if she discussed her
pregnancy and desire for an abortion with either parent or guardian?
What evidence regarding past behavior of the parents or guardians is
there which would show harm would come to the minor if parental or
guardians' consent were requested?
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APPENDIX D
SUGGESTED QUESTIONS FOR DETERMINING
"MATURITY" AND "BEST INTERESTS"
Note: The inquiry should be limited to "maturity" at first, and
should only proceed to "best interests," which is a more intrusive
inquiry, once the court has determined that "maturity" is not sufficient
for granting the petition.
Also, the fact that the teen has come to court at all should itself be
evidence of the teen's "maturity." Teens aged sixteen and seventeen
should be presumptively deemed mature. For teens under age thirteen,
it should be presumed to be in their "best interests" to obtain an abor-
tion.
Questions related to "maturity":
1. How old are you?
2. Have you thought about the personal consequences of the decision
whether to have an abortion?
3. Have you made arrangements to pay for the medical procedure and
any aftercare needs?
4. Do you have any mental condition that would render you unable to
understand the consequences of your choice?
5. Do you feel that you have enough information regarding the medi-
cal, physical, and emotional ramifications of abortion so that you can
make your own choice?
6. Did you get your information from a licensed doctor or clinic? (If
so, it should be presumed to be adequate to provide informed consent
from the teen).
Questions related to "best interests":
1. How old are you?
2. Why do you feel that you should not inform your parent about your
pregnancy and desire for an abortion?
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3. How does your parent generally respond to things that you do that
displease him or her?
4. What would be the medical, physical, social, and emotional conse-
quences to you if you were to consult your parent?
